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Mediation and Advocacy 
 
Autumn Fiester 
 
 
 
One of the concerns about patient advocacy raised by Rasmussen (2012) is that it can be 
understood as a type of “side-taking.”  Although she merely gestures towards the questionable 
moral status of taking sides in an ethics consult (page #), I have argued that side-taking in an 
ethics dispute is morally problematic because it hierarchizes one party’s values over others’ 
without the moral authority or legitimacy to do so (Fiester 2011).  Patient-advocacy is vulnerable 
to this same charge because it is an attempt to advance the interests of the patient, granting the 
patient’s interests a priority that trumps other parties’ interests.  As Rasmussen acknowledges, 
our values-pluralism makes that choice a morally spurious one (note 23). Patient-advocacy, 
therefore, should be morally proscribed. 
But the motivation behind patient-advocacy is a morally laudable one: when patient-
advocacy comes into question, it reveals a clear need of the patient to have her voice amplified 
and her interests better articulated.  The need for patient-advocacy arises when the patient’s 
priorities are not getting proper recognition or consideration. And since this means that someone 
in the consult is being injured or harmed, allowing that harm is itself a moral wrong.  Thus, the 
impetus to advocate comes from an important moral obligation on the part of the consultant to 
protect the patient from that harm. How are we to balance the moral prohibition of side-taking 
with the moral obligation to protect individuals from harm? 
The cause of this ethical dilemma turns out to be the way the problem has been framed.  
When Rasmussen defines the problem as: “Should an ethics consultant ever advocate for the 
patient?,” she obscures the real, root problem that generates this impulse to advocate. The 
problem with her frame is that it implies that the kind of vulnerability at issue here is one that 
only patients can have. We only ever talk about “patient advocacy,” rather than “surrogate 
advocacy,” or “nurse advocacy,” or even “physician advocacy.” And there are reasons for this: it 
is often the case that patients are in the most powerless position in an ethics dispute – but not 
always.  So the problem at the root of Rasmussen’s discussion is more accurately named by the 
question: “Does the patient in this case need help protecting his or her interests and/or values?” 
In the cases she describes, the answer is a resounding “yes.” But that kind of need is not limited 
to patients in an ethics consult: being voiceless, powerless, marginalized, silenced, dominated are 
potential vulnerabilities or liabilities of anyone engaged in a dispute – of any kind, but certainly 
in an ethics-dispute. Some families members can be marginalized by other family members or 
someone on the treating team; sometimes members of the treating team find their moral concerns 
dismissed or deemed irrelevant with the consequence of serious moral distress; sometimes 
patients silence their family members who express concerns about care-decisions that will 
directly impact those very family members; sometimes one member of the provider team will be 
dominated by others in a kind of tyranny of the majority.  In summary, then, the problem that 
generates a need for advocacy is that the voice or interest of a stakeholder in a dispute has failed 
to be heard or articulated, but patient-advocacy only worries about the marginalization of one 
category of stakeholder rather than all of them. 
The solution to the problem of stakeholders being marginalized in an ethics consult is 
mediation. When ethics consultation is done as mediation, the mediator is responsible for 
protecting everyone’s interests and is obligated and accountable for ensuring that no one is 
marginalized or voiceless.  Rasmussen considers mediation but muses that when consultation is 
done as mediation, advocacy would violate the mediator’s obligation to be “neutral” (page #). 
Although she rightly points out that taking a mediation approach to clinical ethics consultation 
precludes patient-advocacy, she is confused about the reasoning behind that prohibition.  
Mediation does not rule out patient-advocacy because it undermines neutrality, but because 
mediation demands universal advocacy for all of the stakeholders’ interests, not just the 
patient’s.  One of the mediator’s critical functions is to safeguard the interests of all individuals 
involved in the ethics consult, which amounts to advocacy for any and all marginalized voices 
and positions in the conversation – from whatever source.  
Mediator-neutrality is often misunderstood.  The mediator is not neutral about how the 
process is conducted, but neutral about what resolution the parties agree to within the constraints 
of law, as Nancy Dubler and Carol Liebman carefully point out (Dubler and Liebman 2011).  In 
fact, the mediator is an absolute partisan when it comes to the process, taking a very hard line: all 
voices must be heard, no one may be silenced, every interest important to the stakeholders 
involved must be articulated. There is no neutrality on those points. Mediation is a carefully 
monitored dialogue intended to help the stakeholders find a shared resolution that brings the 
cherished values and interests of those involved into clear focus. If one person – patient, mother, 
father, child, nurse, physician, etc. – has no conversational space to articulate those values, the 
mediator has failed to protect all of the parties at the table.  Because the mediator does not take a 
stand on which moral positions are legitimate and what outcome is best, the mediator is neutral. 
But the flipside of that mediator neutrality is universal advocacy. If the mediator’s stance is that 
no stakeholder’s values should be aided in trumping any others – hence she is neutral – then her 
stance is also that all stakeholders’ values must be part of the conversation – hence her universal 
advocacy. Without universal advocacy, the mediator’s neutrality is, indeed, compromised, 
because she has hierarchized one set of interests or values over others. Mediation, therefore, 
embraces a kind of constant and revolving advocacy, protecting any parties struggling to have 
their voices heard. But that also means not singling out any category of disputant – e.g., 
“patients” – as those worthy of, or de facto in need of, that type of support or protection.   
 But what about when the patient has no voice at all – either because the patient is too 
young to be granted full status as a decision-maker or because the patient lacks full cognitive 
capacity, as in Rasmussen’s two cases?  When a patient’s voice is absent, fuzzy, faint, or has no 
standing (as in the case of a minor), the patient deserves a true patient advocate, someone who 
can articulate the patient’s values and wishes without any reservations or caveats or conflicts of 
interest.  With that voice genuinely represented, the CEC can then effectively mediate the 
discussion, protecting all interests, so that the parties can come to a shared resolution.  
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